There are number of judgments and judicial pronouncements which significantly led to the development of law on upliftment and protection of women in India. Some of the important judgments which led to the development of law on the protection of women and their rights are mentioned herein under:
Women has right to get equal pay for equal work for women
In Randhir Singh v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 618 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “Equal pay for equal work for both men and women” means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. The Supreme Court held that it is true that the principle of “equal pay for equal work” is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a constitutional goal. Article 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims “equal pay for equal work for both men and women” as a directive principle of State Policy. “Equal pay for equal work for both men and women” means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. directive principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Article 14 of the Constitution enjoins the State not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Article 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone.
A Muslim woman has the right of maintenance under section 125 CrPC
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Begum Subanu v. A.M. Abdul Gafoor (1987) 2 SCC 285 deals with the right of maintenance under section 125 CrPC of muslim women. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the present judgment held that “In so far as muslim wife is concerned there cannot be discrimination between the two situations contemplated by the explanation in section 125(3), CrPC namely of the husbands contracting another marriage or of taking a mistress. The explanation places a second wife and mistress on the same footing and does not make any differentiation between them on the basis of their status under matrimonial law. From the point of view of the neglected wife, for whose benefit the explanation has been provided, it will make no difference whether the woman intruding into her matrimonial life and taking her place in the matrimonial bed is another wife permitted under law to be married and not a mistress.” The Supreme Court further held that “a muslim husband contracting another marriage is equally liable to pay maintenance to previous wife who thereby has a right to live separately. That muslim law permits polygamy is irrelevant to the injury caused to the previous wife. Husband therefore, is liable to maintain previous wife and children.”
Supreme Court took serious view regarding cases of bride burning
The Apex Court vide the judgment of Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam v. State of A.P. (1993) 2 SCC 684 had taken a various serious view regarding cases of bride burning. Hon’ble Justice A.S. Anand, the former Chief Justice of India has observed that “..Of late there has been an alarming increase in cases relating to harassment, torture, abetted suicides and dowry deaths of young innocent brides. This growing cult of violence and exploitation of the young brides, though keeps on sending shock waves to the civilised society whenever it happens, continues unabated. There is a constant erosion of the basic human values of tolerance and the spirit of “live and let live”. Lack of education and economic dependence of women have encouraged the greedy perpetrators of the crime. It is more disturbing and sad that in most of such reported cases it is the woman who plays a pivotal role in this crime against the younger woman, as in this case, with the husband either acting as a mute spectator or even an active participant in the crime, in utter disregard of his matrimonial obligations. In many cases, it has been noticed that the husband, even after marriage, continues to be ‘Mamma’s baby’ and the umbilical cord appears not to have been cut even at that stage…”
Rights of women against sexual harassment in work places
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan 2003(8) SCC 440 has laid down guidelines regarding rights of women against sexual harassment in work places. In this landmark judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down guidelines and norms for protection and enforcement of the rights of women at their work places, which shall be observed and followed at all workplaces or other institutions. The Supreme Court has held that “each incident of sexual harassment of woman at workplace results in violation of the fundamental rights of “Gender Equality” and the “Right to Life and Liberty”. It is a clear violation of the rights under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. One of the logical consequences of such an incident is also the violation of the victim’s fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) “to practise any profession or to carry out any occupation, trade or business”. Such violations, therefore, attract the remedy under Article 32 for the enforcement of these fundamental rights of women. Thus, the power of this Court under Article 32 for enforcement of the fundamental rights and the executive power of the Union have to meet the challenge to protect the working women from sexual harassment and to make their fundamental rights meaningful. In view of the above, and the absence of enacted law to provide for the effective enforcement of the basic human right of gender equality and guarantee against sexual harassment and abuse, more particularly against sexual harassment at workplaces, we lay down the guidelines and norms specified hereinafter for due observance at all workplaces or other institutions, until a legislation is enacted for the purpose. This is done in exercise of the power available under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of the fundamental rights and it is further emphasised that this would be treated as the law declared by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution.
The amount of maintenance fixed for the wife should be such as she can live in reasonable comfort
The Apex Court in case of Vinny Parmvir Parmar v. Parmvir Parmar 2003(8) SCC 440 while discussing the law of maintenance has held that amount of maintenance fixed for the wife should be such as she can live in reasonable comfort considering her status and mode of life she was used to live when she lived with her husband. It has been held that “..No fixed formula can be laid for fixing the amount of maintenance. It has to be in the nature of things which depend on various facts and circumstances of each case. The court has to consider the status of the parties, their respective needs, the capacity of the husband to pay, having regard to reasonable expenses for his own maintenance and others whom he is obliged to maintain under the law and statute. The courts also have to take note of the fact that the amount of maintenance fixed for the wife should be such as she can live in reasonable comfort considering her status and mode of life she was used to live when she lived with her husband.”
Recent Judgments on Domestic Violence Laws
Relationship in the nature of marriage is akin to a common law marriage and live in partner has the right under the domestic violence act to seek relief
The Apex Court in case of D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010) 10 SCC 469 has held that a “relationship in the nature of marriage” is akin to a common law marriage. Common law marriages require that although not being formally married:
(a) The couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses.
(b) They must be of legal age to marry.
(c) They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being unmarried.
(d) They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for a significant period of time.
In our opinion a “relationship in the nature of marriage” under the 2005 Act must also fulfil the above requirements, and in addition the parties must have lived together in a “shared household” as defined in Section 2(s) of the Act. Merely spending weekends together or a one night stand would not make it a “domestic relationship”.
32. In our opinion not all live-in relationships will amount to a relationship in the nature of marriage to get the benefit of the Act of 2005. To get such benefit the conditions mentioned by us above must be satisfied, and this has to be proved by evidence. If a man has a “keep” whom he maintains financially and uses mainly for sexual purpose and/or as a servant it would not, in our opinion, be a relationship in the nature of marriage.
Relief available under the provisions of domestic violence, act may also be sought for in any legal proceeding even before a civil court and family court
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the recent judgment of Juveria Abdul Majid Patni v. Atif Iqbal Mansoori (2014) 10 SCC 736 has held that “It is not necessary that relief available under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 can only be sought for in a proceeding under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Any relief available under the aforesaid provisions may also be sought for in any legal proceeding even before a civil court and Family Court, apart from the criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of the Domestic Violence Act. This is apparent from Section 26 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 as quoted hereunder:
“26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.—(1) Any relief available under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, Family Court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act.
(2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil or criminal court.
(3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of such relief.”
26. The appellant has filed an FIR against the first respondent for the offence committed under Section 498-A IPC. The High Court refused to quash the FIR qua first respondent on the ground that prima facie case has been made out. Even before the criminal court where such case under Section 498-A is pending, if allegation is found genuine, it is always open to the appellant to ask for reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the Domestic Violence Act and interim relief under Section 23 of the said Act.
Husband not allowing wife to live in a shared household even after order of restitution of conjugal rights was passed is a continuance of domestic violence
It has been held by the Apex Court in case of Saraswathy v. Babu 2014 (3) SCC 712 that “In view of the fact that even after the order passed by the Subordinate Judge the respondent husband has not allowed the appellant wife to reside in the shared household/matrimonial house, we hold that there is a continuance of domestic violence committed by the respondent husband against the appellant wife. In view of the such continued domestic violence, it is not necessary for the courts below to decide whether the domestic violence is committed prior to the coming into force of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and whether such act falls within the definition of the term “domestic violence” as defined under Section 3 of the DVA, 2005.”
Police has to look upon any complaint made by a woman alleging offence under domestic violence act seriously
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent case of Santosh Bakshi v. State of Punjab (2014) 13 SCC 25 Supra has held that “The complaint, if made, by any woman alleging offence under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 committed by any member of the family, the matter is to be looked upon seriously. The police without proper verification and investigation cannot submit a report that no case is made out. The investigating agency is required to make proper enquiry not only from the members of the family but also from neighbours, friends and others. After such enquiry, the investigating agency may form a definite opinion and file report but it is for the court to decide finally whether to take cognizance for any offence under any of the provisions of the Act”.
False allegations of domestic violence tantamount to mental cruelty and the same is a valid ground for divorce
It is noteworthy that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Dr. (Mrs.) Malathi Ravi, M.D. versus Dr. B.V. Ravi, M.D. (CIVIL APPEAL NO.5862 OF 2014), while passing its judgment on 30th June 2014, has specifically held that false allegations of domestic violence tantamount to mental cruelty and the same is a valid ground for divorce. The Hon’ble Court has observed and held: “As we have enumerated the incidents, we are disposed to think that the husband has reasons to feel that he has been humiliated, for allegations have been made against him which are not correct; his relatives have been dragged into the matrimonial controversy………….The launching of criminal prosecution can be perceived from the spectrum of conduct……From this kind of attitude and treatment it can be inferred that the husband has been treated with mental cruelty and definitely he has faced ignominy being an Associate Professor in a Government Medical College. When one enjoys social status working in a Government hospital, this humiliation affects the reputation. That apart, it can be well imagined the slight he might be facing. In fact, the chain of events might have compelled him to go through the whole gamut of emotions. It certainly must have hurt his self-respect and human sensibility. The sanguine concept of marriage presumably has become illusory and it would not be inapposite to say that the wife has shown anaemic emotional disposition to the husband. Therefore, the decree of divorce granted by the High Court deserves to be affirmed singularly on the ground of mental cruelty….”
Judicial separation did not mean severance of ties between a husband and wife and hence she cannot be denied her stridhan
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Krishna Bhatacharjee versus Sarathi Choudhury and ANR, (Criminal Appeal No. 1545 of 2015) while drawing a distinction between decree of divorce and decree of judicial separation has held that in the latter, relationship between husband and wife continues as it has not been snapped and the wife will fall under the definition of “aggrieved person” under the Protection of Violence from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and she has the right to claim for her stridhan under the Act and she cannot be denied her stridhan. The Court further held that stridhan property is the exclusive property of the wife.
In domestic violence cases there is no harm in mediating without Court indulgence
It is submitted that the bench of Chief Justice Mohit Shah and Justice RS Dalvi, of the Bombay High Court on September 2015, while treating a letter written by Ms. Jaya Sagade, Director of the Women Studies Centre, ILS Law College, Pune as a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) has stated that the ultimate aim is to provide a fair, meaningful and substantial one-time settlement for the woman through negotiations. Setting aside a state government circular that prohibited counselling and mediation in domestic violence cases without a court order, the Bombay High Court has held that the circular was “discriminatory, arbitrary and unreasonable.” Further, it laid down guidelines on how pre-litigation counselling may be conducted by any registered service provider, including NGOs, counselors and police officers.